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Impatience for reward is a facet of many psychiatric disorders. We draw attention
to a growing literature finding greater discounting of delayed reward, an important
aspect of impatience, across a range of psychiatric disorders. We propose these
findings are best understood by considering the goals and motivation for discounting
future reward. We characterize these as arising from either the opportunity costs of
waiting or the uncertainty associated with delayed reward. We link specific instances of
higher discounting in psychiatric disorder to heightened subjective estimates of either
of these factors. We propose these costs are learned and represented based either
on a flexible cognitive model of the world, an accumulation of previous experience,
or through evolutionary specification. Any of these can be considered suboptimal for
the individual if the resulting behavior results in impairments in personal and social
functioning and/or in distress. By considering the neurochemical and neuroanatomical
implementation of these processes, we illustrate how this approach can in principle unite
social, psychological and biological conceptions of impulsive choice.
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INTRODUCTION
Vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat incohare longam
Life’s short span forbids our embracing far-reaching hopes - Horace, Odes (23BC)
Humans and animals often accept a smaller reward immediately, rather than wait to receive a
larger reward in the future (Ainslie, 1974; Thaler, 1981; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Fishburn and
Rubinstein, 1982; Frederick et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Pine
et al., 2009). In economic terms, this behavior indicates that the subjective value of reward decreases
as it is delayed, a process referred to as temporal discounting (for reviews see Frederick et al.,
2002; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008). As we will discuss, biological agents have good reason to
discount delayed rewards, since these might either fail to materialize or arrive too late to satisfy the
organism’s current needs. Indeed, as pointed out by the Roman poet Horace in the quotation above,
the ultimate motive for discounting is that the agent will die before deferred rewards are realized.
In humans, temporal discounting can be measured by examining choices between quantities of
money at varying delays (Mazur, 1987; Kirby andMarakovic´, 1995; Myerson et al., 2001; Green and
Myerson, 2004). Themost commonly usedmethod elicits choices between a larger, delayed amount
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of money, (e.g., “$100 in 6 months”), and a series of immediate
amounts of decreasing magnitude (e.g., “$80 today”). By
observing at each delay the magnitude of smaller-sooner reward
at which the participant switches to preferring the later reward,
the decrease in value of the later reward can be plotted as a
function of delay. A non-parametric estimate of discounting can
be derived by taking the area beneath this indifference curve
(Myerson et al., 2001). Alternatively, the shape of the curve can
be fitted with a discount function.
Samuelson (1937), and later Strotz (1957), showed that a
decision-maker who discounts future benefits according to an
exponentially decreasing function (and behaves as if to maximize
the sum of exponentially discounted reward) allocates resources
across time in a self-consistent manner. Under the classical
model, the effect of delay, d, is described by an (exponential)
discount function, here denoted by1(d), such that:
△
(
d
)
= e−kd (1)
Where k is an exponential discount rate, such that higher values
of k lead to a steeper decrease in reward value with delay. The
effect of reward magnitude, here signified by r, is independently
described by an instantaneous utility function, u(r), such that the
subjective utility of a stream of future rewards is then given by:
U (rt, rt+ 1, rt+ 2 . . . rT−1, rT) =
T∑
t
u(rτ )△(τ − t) (2)
As reviewed by Frederick et al. (2002), the above account was
not intended as a veridical psychological model of choice over
time. In keeping with this, many experimental studies have
shown that a discounting function is better approximated via
a hyperbolic than an exponential function (e.g., Green et al.,
1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Kirby and Marakovic´, 1995;
Myerson and Green, 1995; Laibson, 1997; van der Pol and Cairns,
2002; Rubinstein, 2003), of the form:
1
(
d
)
=
1
1+ kd
(3)
Here k denotes a hyperbolic discount rate (though for alternative
accounts see Read, 2001; Kable and Glimcher, 2010; Read et al.,
2012; Luhmann, 2013).
Temporal discounting has received considerable attention in
human behavioral neuroscience, not least because many forms
of maladaptive behavior are readily characterized as pursuit
of immediate gratification at the expense of reaping greater
rewards in the future (Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Bickel et al.,
2007, 2014a; Koffarnus et al., 2013; Story et al., 2014). Indeed,
lending validity to the discounting construct, steeper discounting
is positively associated with behaviors with potentially harmful
long-term consequences such as tobacco smoking (Odum et al.,
2002; Epstein et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Bickel et al., 2008;
MacKillop and Kahler, 2009; Fields et al., 2009a,b; Reynolds and
Fields, 2012), alcohol use (VanOers et al., 1999;Mazas et al., 2000;
Petry, 2001; Field et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007; Rossow, 2008;
MacKillop and Kahler, 2009; Moore and Cusens, 2010), illicit
drugmisuse (Kirby et al., 1999; Petry and Casarella, 1999; Kollins,
2003; Petry, 2003; Kirby and Petry, 2004; Washio et al., 2011;
Stanger et al., 2012), credit card debt (Meier and Sprenger, 2012)
and risky sexual or drug-taking practices (Odum et al., 2000;
Dierst-Davies et al., 2011). Also, many authors have explored
how discounting relates to demographic variables, finding that
measured discounting decreases across the lifespan (Green et al.,
1996, 1999; Chao et al., 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009), is negatively
correlated with income (Green et al., 1996; Eckel et al., 2005;
Reimers et al., 2009), and tends to be lower in individuals living
in the developed world than in the developing world (Wang
et al., 2010). Furthermore, although discounting is sensitive to
a gamut of contextual factors (for a review see Koffarnus et al.,
2013), the level of discounting has been shown to exhibit high
test-retest reliability when measured under similar conditions
(Odum, 2011), and the extent of individual discounting for
different forms of reward is correlated (Odum, 2011), suggesting
that discounting has a substantial trait component.
More recently, researchers have taken an interest in
comparing discounting behavior in groups who exhibit
symptoms of a given psychiatric disorder and those who do
not. These studies have found evidence for steeper discounting
amongst patients with symptoms of schizophrenia (Heerey
et al., 2007, 2011; Ahn et al., 2011; MacKillop and Tidey,
2011; Wing et al., 2012; Avsar et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2014),
depression (Takahashi et al., 2008; Dennhardt and Murphy,
2011; Dombrovski et al., 2012; Imhoff et al., 2014; Pulcu et al.,
2014), mania (Mason et al., 2012), attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) (Barkley et al., 2001; Tripp and Alsop, 2001;
Bitsakou et al., 2009; Paloyelis et al., 2010a,b; Scheres et al.,
2010; Scheres and Hamaker, 2010), anxiety disorder (Rounds
et al., 2007) and cluster B personality disorder (Dougherty et al.,
1999; Moeller et al., 2002; Petry, 2002; Dom et al., 2006a,b;
Lawrence et al., 2010; Coffey et al., 2011). This line of enquiry
is not without theoretical justification, for example the broader
construct of impulsivity, defined as taking action without
forethought or regard for consequences (Moeller et al., 2001),
of which discounting is an element, is a defining feature of
some psychiatric disorders, for example borderline personality
disorder (Moeller et al., 2001; DSM V, 2013) and mania (Swann,
2009). Also, psychiatric disorders are strongly associated with
poor health choices, including but not limited to cigarette
smoking, and drug and alcohol misuse (Robson and Gray, 2007),
which have themselves been associated with steeper discounting
(Bickel et al., 2012b, 2014a,b; Story et al., 2014). However, in
many cases this research, although clearly valuable, appears to
have been opportunist.
In this article we attempt to understand increases in
discounting seen across a range of psychiatric disorders in light
of the reasons why people should discount the future in the first
place. We propose that the study of intertemporal impulsivity
in psychiatric disorders would benefit from fractionating these
underlying motives, and that parsing discounting in this
manner can assist in drawing out the contributing psychological
and biological processes. Our approach follows that of the
neuroscientist David Marr (Marr, 1982), who proposed that
information processing systems can be understood at three
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levels of analysis: a “computational” level, specifying what
information processing problem is being solved by the system,
an “algorithmic” level, formalizing how the system attempts to
solve the problem, and an “implementational” level, denoting
how these processes are realized physically.
For the case of discounting, the computational problem is
easily defined in economic terms: to optimize the sum of future
reward. However, this definition obscures a difficult question
as to what constitutes “reward” (Moutoussis et al., 2015). It
is convenient here to assume that all biological agents share
some fundamental objective function. Rather than attempting
to characterize the objective function directly, we assume some
consensus on the kinds of outcome that organisms often seek,
and that can therefore be considered “rewarding.” We then
consider a subset of generic scenarios under which behavior
consistent with discounting would indeed optimize the sum
of future “reward.” This will give us some insight as to the
contexts that agents, who discount future reward in different
ways, including humans deemed to have mental disorders, might
be adapted to.
We go on to speculate as to the broad classes of algorithms
that biological agents might use to optimize reward, and where
relevant their possible neural implementation. We argue that the
application of this approach to psychiatric disorders, the bedrock
of the emerging field of computational psychiatry (Huys et al.,
2011; Montague et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2014; Stephan and
Mathys, 2014; Wang and Krystal, 2014), can help to bridge a gap
between psychological and biological conceptions of mental ill
health (for further discussion see Moutoussis et al., 2015).
MARR’S COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL:
REASONS TO DISCOUNT FUTURE
REWARD
The discount function estimated from the analysis of
intertemporal choice paradigms is likely to reflect the influence
of factors jointly serving to make impatience potentially
advantageous. A key ambiguity in the classical economic model
concerns whether these factors should be properly assigned to
the time series of future rewards, or to the discount function
(Frederick et al., 2002; Frederick and Loewenstein, 2008; Friston
et al., 2013; for a review of contextual influences on discounting
see Koffarnus et al., 2013). The following discussion illustrates
that if they are made fully explicit in the utility function, behavior
consistent with temporal discounting emerges.
Opportunity Cost
Growth and Missed Investment
For most organisms growth and development are necessary
to reach reproductive capacity (Williams, 1957). For humans,
development also extends to furthering one’s social status.
Growth potential motivates obtaining rewards sooner rather
later, since earlier rewards can be invested—effectively loaned
out at some rate of interest (see Rachlin, 2006; Kacelnik, 2011).
The form of discounting that results depends on whether or
not interest can be re-invested. Under the most straighforward
scenario, referred to as simple interest, interest is not reinvested
during the term of the loan. Consider a reward with utility r (for
simplicity we omit the instantaneous utility function) invested
for a period of time, d, to yield a larger payout, R. With simple
interest:
R = r + krd (4)
Solving for r and expressing as a ratio of the payout gives:
r
R
=
1
1 + kd
(5)
A decision-maker should therefore be indifferent between a
larger reward of utility, R, received after a delay, d, and a
smaller reward, r, received immediately. Thus, linear growth
(simple interest) motivates hyperbolic discounting (see Read,
2004; Rachlin, 2006).
In the above example, after the delay has lapsed the agent
ought to reclaim their money and re-invest the entire payout to
avoid losing out to a lower rate of interest. Compound interest
represents a continual reinvestment of the payout, and generates
exponential growth, such that the payout accrued at time d after
choosing r is given by:
R = regd (6)
Where g reflects the interest rate. Rearranging as before gives:
r
R
= e−gd (7)
Thus, compound interest motivates exponential discounting.
Missed Income
In the natural world, delay often entails inactive waiting, during
which other sources of reward cannot be harvested. The cost
associated with an inactive delay can be quantified as the reward
that is missed out on while waiting (Kacelnik, 2011). Under
one such formulation, organisms should consequently choose
an action which maximizes a rate of reward per unit time, a
concept that has arisen in ecological theory independently from
the notion of discounting (Stevens and Krebs, 1986). Under this
formulation, discounted value is simply inversely proportional
to delay (Chung and Herrnstein, 1967). It can be easily shown
however that if even “immediate” rewards are associated with
some small delay, m, where m = 1/k, this is equivalent to
hyperbolic discounting (Daw and Touretzky, 2000). Thus, at
indifference:
r
m
=
R
m + d
(8)
Rearranging as previously:
r
R
=
m
m + d
=
1
1 + d/m
=
1
1 + kd
(9)
A corollary of this theory is that the opportunity cost of delaying
reward on a particular option depends on the average rate of
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reward from all other options (Chung and Herrnstein, 1967; Daw
and Touretzky, 2000; Niv et al., 2007).
Inactive waiting leads to interesting results if other options
become available only once the delays associated with the current
choice have lapsed. Consider for example a lawyer who is paid
by the hour for seeing clients at weekdays, but does not work at
weekends. Say that he or she has two lunch options, either waiting
in a long queue for a tasty lunch at a popular café, or being able
to buy an equally calorific but less enjoyable meal straightaway
at a sandwich bar. The lawyer might be optimally inclined to
choose the sandwich bar on weekdays, so as to facilitate a sooner
return to work, but might choose to wait at the café if faced with
the same choice on a weekend. Here the intertemporal choice
is influenced by other available sources of reward, which are
inaccessible during the delay. In ecological terms, if an organism
is foraging in a reward-rich area, the opportunity cost of delaying
foraging by engaging in other activities is greater than when
foraging in a reward-poor area (Niv et al., 2007).
Thus, expressed in terms of the total reward received, and
letting the average rate of reward available after the delay be
signified by ρ, then at indifference:
R = r + ρd (10)
Thus:
r = R − ρd (11)
This arrangement allows for the possibility that a delayed reward
carries negative value, whereby a decision-maker would willing
to pay so as to be able to resume seeking rewards at the average
rate, rather than to wait for the delayed reward.
Uncertainty
Probability and Hazard
Whenever reward (capital) is stored for the future, for example
when a person lends money to another person or when an animal
stores food, there is some possibility that the capital will be lost
(for example if a conspecific raids the food store or the debtor
defaults on their loan). If there is some constant probability per
unit time, referred to as a hazard rate, that future rewards do not
materialize as promised, the expected value of reward (magnitude
× probability) decreases exponentially with delay and gives rise
to exponential discounting (Sozou, 1998).
Following the notation above at indifference:
r = Re−λt (12)
Rearranging:
r
R
= e−λt (13)
Where λ denotes a constant hazard rate.
Thus, the agent choosing whether to store reward should
adopt a discount rate appropriate to the estimated hazard rate.
For example a creditor ought to demand a rate of interest that
is commensurate with the risk of the debtor’s chance of default
per unit time. Interestingly, where the appropriate hazard rate
is uncertain, decision-makers ought to weight each possible
hazard rate by its probability of being the true rate; such a
weighted average of exponential rates approximates hyperbolic
discounting (Sozou, 1998; Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2009). As
shown by Sozou (1998), hyperbolic discounting results exactly if:
∫
∞
0
f (λ) e−λt dλ =
1
1 + kt
(14)
Where f (λ) is a probability density function over hazard rates.
The above is satisfied if:
f (λ) =
1
k
e−λ/k (15)
i.e., if there is an exponential prior distribution over hazard rates,
where k determines the shape of this distribution. In support of
Sozou’s theory, Takahashi et al. (2007) find that the subjective
probability of receiving delayed reward in standard intertemporal
choice tasks indeed decays hyperbolically.
As the quotation at the start of this article encapsulates, death
creates a fundamental motive not to defer rewards for too long. In
computational terms death can be considered to be an absorbing
state, from which no future reward can be harvested. Notably a
hazard rate for the event of dying can be seen to depend on the
organism’s current state, such that a greater physiological deficit
is associated with a greater probability of dying per unit time.
The fundamental value of reward is then its effect to reduce the
hazard rate for dying (before successfully securing one’s legacy).
This argument suggests that it is optimal for biological agents
to discount future reward more steeply when they are currently
far from a physiological set point, based simply on an increased
probability of their dying before future reward is attained.
Volatility
In summary, environmental hazards create a motive to discount
the future, since future rewards might not materialize as
promised. In addition, the utility of future rewardsmight bemore
uncertain, in the sense of having higher variance than immediate
rewards (when the variance is known the resulting uncertainty
is referred to as risk). Many behavioral economic studies have
shown that people tend to be risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Holt and Laury, 2002; Trepel et al., 2005; Andersen et al.,
2008; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Jones and Rachlin, 2009), in so
far as they will accept a smaller expected payoff over a larger
expected payoff with higher variance. If future events tend to
evolve with a random component, the uncertainty associated
with future events increases with delay (Mathys et al., 2011). To
take an example, a decision-maker responding to a discounting
questionnaire might have some degree of uncertainty about
the subjective utility of a $20 payout received immediately
(if this appears implausible, imagine being paid in a foreign
currency, whose worth is uncertain). However, owing to volatility
governing future events in their lives (e.g., becoming ill, falling
into debt, national economic collapse), uncertainty regarding the
utility of the $20 ought to increase as it is delayed. In combination
with risk aversion this motivates delay discounting. In support
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of this idea, individual discount rates are correlated with risk
aversion (Leigh, 1986; Anderhub et al., 2001; Eckel et al., 2005;
Jones and Rachlin, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010).
Notably, risk aversion can be expressed in terms of probability
discounting, which is found to be hyperbolic in the odds
against receiving a reward. Whilst probability discounting
and temporal discounting are often found to be correlated
across individuals (e.g., Jones and Rachlin, 2009), they are
subject to distinct influences. For example, increasing reward
magnitude increases probability discounting (i.e., risk aversion)
and decreases temporal discounting (Green and Myerson, 2004).
This is often taken as evidence that temporal discounting
does not encompass an estimate of the risk associated with
future rewards. However, pertinent to discounting is how a
person estimates risk to be dependent on delay. Probability
discounting offers a measure of risk aversion but does not
access this time-dependent representation of risk. In support
of this idea Takahashi et al. (2007) find that while probability
and temporal discounting are uncorrelated across individuals,
temporal discounting does correlate with the rate of decay in
the subjective probability of receiving reward after increasing
delay. This may help explain why psychiatric disorders are often
associated with increased inter-temporal discounting but not
necessarily with excessive probability discounting.
MARR’S ALGORITHMIC LEVEL:
PROCESSES SUB-SERVING
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE
In the preceding analysis we have outlined some generic
scenarios under which behavior consistent with discounting
would be optimal. These scenarios illustrate that discounting
need not be considered as a unitary process, rather as (implicitly
or explicitly) reflecting an expectation of different environmental
contingencies. Under reinforcement learning formulations, such
contingencies are seen as engendering transtitions in a state-
space (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Dayan
and Daw, 2008; Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2009). That it is,
an action is assumed to move the agent from one (discrete)
state to another, where each state may be associated with a
varying quantity of reward. The state-space is equivalent to the
vector of rewards described in the classical economic model
(Equation 2), though may also be made contingent on the agent’s
future behavior, giving rise to a matrix, or “decision-tree.” A key
question for this account is whether the (discounted) utility of
a delayed reward is directly parameterized, which is to say that
there is no more inference or learning beyond the state where
this utility is considered, or whether the delayed reward is instead
considered as part of a cascade of preceding states.
A Parametric Discount Function?
If higher organisms indeed represent a discount function
parametrically, they would require a widespread and efficient
system for making this information accessible for decision-
making. Neuromodulatory systems, with their diffuse
connections to many areas of the brain, would be well
placed to achieve this, and several authors have speculated
that neuromodulators, such as dopamine and norepinephrine
might represent some of the relevant parameters. For example,
Niv et al. (2007) have proposed that the average rate of reward is
signaled in the mammalian brain by tonic levels of extracellular
dopamine in the striatum, suggesting that increased striatal
dopamine availability might increase discounting by increasing
the implicit opportunity cost of delay. Commensurate with this
hypothesis, systemic administration in humans of the dopamine
precursor l-Dopa increases discount rates (Pine et al., 2010),
although potentially countervailing evidence is that decreasing
dopamine transmission in rats by administration of haloperidol
(Denk et al., 2005) or flupethixol (Floresco et al., 2008) has been
found to increase discounting, or in other studies to exert no
significant effect on discounting (Winstanley et al., 2005).
Similarly, a good deal of decision-making neuroscience seeks
to uncover how uncertainty is represented neurally (see Behrens
et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2010; Mathys et al., 2011; Nassar
et al., 2012). A recent suggestion is that operating in an unstable
environment is associated with tonic release (over a time course
of minutes) of norepinephrine (Yu and Dayan, 2003, 2005).
The latter would suggest that tonic norepinephrine might signal
environmental volatility, and thus influence discounting. Clearly,
further psychopharmacological work is needed to fully uncover
the role of monoaminergic signaling on discounting behavior.
Also, if organisms indeed have a parametric model of discounting
in the strictest sense, then this ought be revealed in the manner
in which estimates of discounting are updated in light of changes
in the environment, and careful behavioral work is required to
probe this possibility.
Discounting as a Revealed Phenomenon
According to a second possibility outlined above, choosing a
delayed reward leads to a cascade of states, and may (or may not)
lead to the promised reward, which if it occurs, may be delivered
in a variety of future states (just in time for Christmas, after I’ve
been killed by a bus, etc.) (see Peters and Büchel, 2010). If an
agent uses this cascade of states to evaluate their actions, only the
resulting transitions will endow this action with whatever value
percolates through from the end states. Here discounting takes
place due to learning and/or inference, where the value of the
reward gradually evaporates as inference (or learning) propagates
through a cascade of states. Given the properties of organisms
and their environments, as outlined above, behavior consistent
with discounting would simply emerge as the end result of
applying these learning processes to situations where there is
delay in the receipt of reward. Under this possibility, in terms of
the economic model, all relevant information is summarized in
an agent’s utility function, which then implicitly incorporates the
discount function. It appears likely that organisms use parallel
mechanisms to calculate the value of the resulting state-space,
operating across different timescales of information integration,
ranging from updating innate behaviors through evolution,
through learning from experience, to inferring future states via
deployment of a cognitive map or model of the world.
Reliable valuations may be refined and passed on through
genetic inheritance and evolution. For example, the possibility of
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death, and its associated opportunity cost, is likely incorporated
through evolution, whereby internal states deviating from a
homeostatic ideal, such as hunger and thirst, are assigned
an innate cost as a proxy (see Keramati and Gutkin, 2011).
Thus, discounting for food would be expected to increase
when hungry, due to innate negative value associated with
prolonging a state of hunger. Furthermore, actions themselves
might in some cases be selected from an innately determined
repertoire. Through Pavlovian conditioning, a stimulus (termed
unconditioned stimulus, US, e.g., food) that elicits an innate
response (the unconditioned response, e.g., salivation), can
become associated with another stimulus (conditioned stimulus,
CS, e.g., a tone), such that the latter subsequently becomes
capable of eliciting an appropriate innate response independently
(Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Williams and Williams, 1969;
Hershberger, 1986; Pavlov, 2003). Here the conditioning process,
whereby CS becomes associated with US, can incorporate the cost
of delay to conform to the optimal adaptations of some of the
computational processes above. For example, if delivery of food
follows a tone, with an intervening delay of 10 s, the “Pavlovian
value” of the tone may be temporally discounted by a given
proportion per unit time relative to that of the food (Domjan,
2003). Algorithmic accounts of classical conditioning, such as
temporal difference learning, thus incorporate an exponential
discount factor (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Moutoussis et al., 2008;
Dayan, 2009; Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2009). Exactly how such
discounting is represented at a neurobiological process level
remains unclear, but the influences outlined must be important.
For example, the incremental process of temporal-difference
learning, including Rescorla-Wagner learning (Domjan, 2003),
means that the strength of the association between CS and US
comes to reflect their probabilistic relationship.
Organisms can also learn the value of actions based simply
on whether or not they yielded benefits in the past, referred
to as instrumental conditioning (Domjan, 2003). In algorithmic
terms, this can be most parsimoniously achieved by integrating
the history of reinforcement following a given action, without
representing an explicit model of the relationship between
actions and their outcomes (Watkins and Dayan, 1992; Daw
et al., 2005; Seymour et al., 2005; Schultz, 2006; Moutoussis
et al., 2008; McDannald et al., 2011). This is referred to
as model-free reinforcement learning, and corresponds to the
“Thorndikian” Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1927), or “habit”
learning (Dickinson et al., 1995; Ouellette, 1998; Neal, 2006;
Tricomi et al., 2009; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Orbell and
Verplanken, 2014). Instrumental learning would be expected to
incorporate discounting, to the extent that the environmental
influences described earlier in this article affect the timecourse
of reward contingent on a particular action.
Finally, biological agents can be availed of a cognitive map, or
model, of the world, detailing the results of different actions and
their respective values (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998; Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011;
McDannald et al., 2011). The choice of action proceeds by
thinking forward through the map (or tree), and considering
the consequences of alternative actions (see Seymour and Dolan,
2008). This mode of control is referred to in reinforcement
learning applications as model-based (Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw
et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012; Smittenaar et al., 2013;
Lucantonio et al., 2014), and corresponds to the definition
of goal-directed behavior in animal learning as being rapidly
sensitive to changes in the contingency between action and
outcome, or to devaluing the outcome (Dickinson and Balleine,
1994; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). An advantage of the model-
based approach lies in its flexibility. For example, this approach
is necessary to generate appropriate intertemporal choices in
esoteric scenarios, to which a smooth discount function is not
well adapted. For example, say a generous experimenter offers
me a choice between $100 today and $125 4 weeks from today.
The knowledge that I will be receiving my monthly pay of
$1000 exactly 4 weeks from today, and that without additional
income I am likely to exceed my overdraft limit next week by
around $50, incurring a heavy fine, would likely encourage me
to choose the immediate money. If I were to try choose between
the immediate and delayed money according to a parametric
discount function alone, without considering extraneous sources
of (dis)utility, I might lose out to the overdraft fine. In summary,
through the above innate and instrumental learning processes,
given appropriate experience of the cost of delay, an organism can
behave in a manner consistent with discounting without directly
computing discounted value at all.
(MAL)ADAPTIVE DISCOUNTING IN
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
We propose that whether parametric, or revealed through the
above valuation processes, discounting nevertheless represents
encoding of different environmental contingencies. It is therefore
noteworthy, where changes in discounting are observed, for
example in psychiatric disorders, to consider such changes in
light of the environment to which a given individual might be
“tuned to” (see also Del Giudice, 2014). The key point here is that,
the decision-maker brings to a laboratory intertemporal choice
task their previous experience of delay and may also consider the
rewards of the task in the context of other future outcomes they
expect to receive. We consider particular instances of this below.
Mania as a State of Increased Opportunity
Cost
Might steeper discounting in some pathological states reflect
increased estimates of opportunity cost? In support of
discounting being sensitive to changes in opportunity cost,
discount rates for money have been shown to increase in
line with increases in inflation (Ostaszewski et al., 1998).
More speculatively, steeper discount rates in childhood and
adolescence which decline into adulthood (Green et al., 1999;
Chao et al., 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009) might even reflect
greater potential for growth in adolescence. We propose that
the pathological state of mania is associated with perceived high
rates of reward and high growth potential, creating a heightened
opportunity cost associated with inaction. Mania is known to
be associated with impulsive behavior, such as overspending,
rash financial decision-making or drug–taking (Swann, 2009),
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and one study (Mason et al., 2012) finds evidence for steeper
discounting in an intertemporal choice task with real-time delays
in the order of seconds in individuals prone to hypomanic
symptoms.
Notably growth potential creates something of a paradox.
On the one hand investing reward to achieve growth implies
that the decision maker has adopted a long-term view. On the
other hand, having something worthwhile to invest in favors
choices that obtain rewards sooner rather than later, so that
they too can be invested. For example, imagine you are starting
a new business venture. Whilst this is necessarily a long-term
project, you might sacrifice other potential rewards, such as
your health or relationships, in order to invest resources in
the business, which can be seen as borrowing predicated on a
high level of return from your new business. Manic individuals
generate novel, and often unrealistically ambitious, goals, for
example, enlisting on education courses, or indeed starting new
business ventures (DSM V, 2013). We propose that these goals
create high opportunity costs to delaying reward, increasing
preference for immediate rewards, so as to enlist resources for
goal-pursuit. This offers a putative psychological explanation for
why increased impulsivity in mania (Swann, 2009), including
steeper discounting (Mason et al., 2012), manifests alongside an
apparent increase in goal-directed activity.
The investment in apparently long-term goals in mania
seems to occur at the expense of patients correctly “playing
out” or “forward modeling” future scenarios themselves. This
explains why the same (mal)adaptation is found across several
behavioral domains. McClure and colleagues (McClure et al.,
2004, 2007) have suggested that the explicit influence of larger-
later options on behavior is associated with greater cognitive
control, which is reduced in mania in tandem with prefrontal
activation (Murphy et al., 1999; Townsend et al., 2010). This
reduction in “forward modeling” is in fact consistent—if not
necessary—for the suggestion we make here to work. That is, if
a person with mania were to consider in detail the path ahead
leading to their goals, they would realize that the projection
implicit in their growth estimate is unrealistic and they would
feel able to afford to be patient. A further interesting possibility,
discussed further below, is that such forwardmodeling itself takes
time, and that in the face of high opportunity costs, the depth of
such model-based strategies is reduced in favor of more rough-
and-ready heuristics, or more Pavlovian or habitual responding
(Dezfouli, 2009; Huys et al., 2012). Future investigations of mania
might focus on measuring beliefs about growth and opportunity
cost directly, and whether such beliefs correlate with changes in
discounting. Interestingly, Dezfouli (2009) similarly propose that
the abnormally high rewards engendered by drugs of abuse lead
to an artifically elevated estimate of the average reward rate in the
environment, and that this accounts for increased discounting
seen amongst substance abusers (e.g., Kirby et al., 1999; Kollins,
2003; Kirby and Petry, 2004).
Finally, we have shown above how an increase in the rate of
reward available from activities other than those currently on offer
increases impatience to complete the current activity as soon as
possible (i.e., increases discounting for rewards obtained from
the task in hand). Niv et al. (2007) use the same approach to
explain variations in response vigor. In their model they propose
that the agent can choose to reduce latency of its responses, at
some energetic cost that is proportional to the latency reduction.
Thus, choosing how quickly to perform a particular action itself
becomes an intertemporal choice. As their model illustrates,
greater vigor (shorter response latency) is then optimal where
the average reward rate is higher, in order that agents can resume
reward seeking as soon as possible. This description accords well
with that of mania, where sufferers often describe the need to
complete various tasks with great urgency and where the general
vigor of behavior is markedly increased. Furthermore, the model
of Niv and colleagues incorporates a latency-independent cost
associated with switching tasks. As the authors show, at high
reward rates latency-dependent costs tend to dwarf the switching
cost, leading to greater task switching than at low reward rates.
This too is in keeping with behavior exhibited in manic states,
where sufferers have difficulty sustaining tasks.
Economic Poverty as a Deficit State
In keeping with the normative notion that deficit states increase
a hazard rate for losing out on future reward, discounting indeed
tends to be higher in states of monetary or physiological deficit.
For example, steeper discounting is observed in individuals with
lower incomes (Green et al., 1996; Reimers et al., 2009), an effect
which remains after controlling for level of education. Of course,
such studies are correlational, making it difficult to conclude
that changes in income directly alter discounting. However, an
interesting study by Callan et al. (2011) provides indirect support
for a more causal role of low income in increasing discounting.
The authors found that a manipulation which lead people to
believe that their income was lower than their peers brought
about an increase in discounting, relative to a group who were
lead to believe that their income was similar to that of their peers.
The manipulation was interpreted as priming personal notions
of deservedness, though this might just as easily be formalized
as a shift toward a perceived deficit state. In a conceptually
related study Haushofer et al. (2013) performed an experiment
in which subjects performed an effort task for monetary reward,
after which different groups received either an increase in income
from a low starting endowment, or a decrease in income from a
high starting endowment. The design thus allowed the effect of
(experimental) wealth changes to be dissociated from absolute
wealth. Subjects’ temporal discount rates were measured before
and after the task, with the finding that negative income shocks
lead to an increase in discounting, while positive income shocks
effected a small decrease in discounting. Starting wealth was
found to be unrelated to discounting. Notably, the size of an
experimental endowment might not be expected to have an
effect on discounting, since the endowment was likely to be
small in comparison to subjects’ total real-world wealth. The
effect of negative income shocks, which might be interpreted
as having primed an increased hazard rate for future earnings,
suggests that instability in earnings, rather than simply total
wealth, is an important determinant of the relationship between
socioeconomic status and discounting.
A study in women deprived of food and water (for 4 h
after their usual waking time) found that women given a pre-
loading meal prior to testing chose an option leading to the
delayed, rather than immediate, delivery of juice significantly
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and significantly more so than women who had not received
a preloading meal (Kirk and Logue, 1997). Also, Wang and
Dvorak (2010) measured monetary discounting before and after
participants drank either a sugary or a sugar-free drink (both
caffeine-free), finding a significant decrease in discounting in the
group who drank the sugary drink and a significant increase
in the control group. This finding suggests that raising blood
glucose decreases discounting, an idea congruent with increased
discounting associated with deficit states.
Economic poverty may well underlie some of the steeper
discounting seen in psychiatric disorders, through an association
between mental illness and lower socioeconomic status (e.g.,
Weich and Lewis, 1998; Lorant et al., 2007) (however in several
studies associations remain after controlling for socioeconomic
characterisitics). Notably, there may be an interdependent
relationship between low socioeconomic status, discounting,
and mental ill health, whereby impatience for rewards leads
to maladaptive choices such as substance misuse, which in
turn are associated with worsening finances, further increases
in discounting and increased risk of psychiatric disorder (e.g.,
Fields et al., 2009b; Leitão et al., 2013). A similar idea has
been championed by Bickel et al. (2014b), who propose that the
environment associated with low socioeconomic status promotes
steeper discounting, which in turn engenders unhealthy choices,
thus contributing to known socioeconomic gradients in health
status (Adler and Rehkopf, 2008). This is supported by evidence
that cigarette smoking, obesity, alcohol use and illicit drug
use all exhibit negative relationships with socioeconomic status
(Conner and Norman, 2005), that these behaviors are associated
with poor executive functioning (e.g., Bickel et al., 2012a),
and that economic poverty is prospectively associated with
poor executive functioning (Lupien et al., 2007; Noble et al.,
2007; Evans and Schamberg, 2009). We discuss this interaction
between environment and cognition in Section The Cost of
Thinking in Economic Poverty, Borderline Personality Disorder
and Schizophrenia below.
ADHD as a Deficit State
Interestingly, the effects of deprivation appear to cross modalities
of reward. For example, mild opioid deprivation in opioid
dependent individuals increases discounting for money as well as
heroin (Giordano et al., 2002). Arguably this might be motivated
by a desire on the part of subjects to obtain money sooner
so as to buy drugs. However, it might equally be attributable
to a more global alteration in decision-making associated with
physiological deficit states (see also Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe
and Mischel, 1999). In further support of this idea, exposure
to erotic cues increases discounting for money, as well as for
candy bars or soda drinks in men (Van den Bergh et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the effect of sex cues to increase discounting
for food and drink rewards was attenuated by satiation with
money, providing evidence for a global physiological signaling
mechanism. Niv et al. (2007) propose that this mechanism
“global drive” mechanism might involve modulation in tonic
dopamine signaling.
In some cases steeper discounting observed in psychiatric
disorders might reflect processes associated with normal deficit
states. ADHD is a possible example. ADHD is defined
by behavioral symptoms of inattentiveness, over-activity and
impulsivity, of long-standing duration and is most commonly
diagnosed in school-aged children (DSM V, 2013). Many studies
have shown that children with ADHD have a greater tendency
than controls to choose immediate over delayed rewards in
single choices (e.g., Sonuga−Barke et al., 1992; Schweitzer and
Sulzer−Azaroff, 1995; Kuntsi et al., 2001; Bitsakou et al., 2009; for
reviews see Luman et al., 2005; Paloyelis et al., 2009) and (relative
to controls) are biased toward choosing tasks which yield earlier,
rather than delayed, reinforcement (Tripp and Alsop, 2001).
Also, on delay of gratification tasks (Mischel et al., 1989) children
with hyperactivity exhibit a greater tendency to terminate the
delay to obtain a smaller reward, rather than waiting an allotted
time for a larger reward (Rapport et al., 1986). Furthermore,
several studies now report steeper monetary discounting in
children with ADHD (Paloyelis et al., 2009; Scheres et al., 2010;
Wilson et al., 2011; Demurie et al., 2012) or in adults with
previous ADHD (Hurst et al., 2011).
We hypothesize that the increased discounting rates found
in ADHD reflect both the well-known genetic vulnerability for
this disorder but also encode the more deprived environments
that lead to increased expression of this disorder (Apperley and
Mittal, 2013; Russell et al., 2015). In support of this, in one study
boys with ADHD symptoms who had been reared in deprived
institutions showed increased aversion to delay compared with
ADHD controls compared to less deprived patients (Loman,
2012). Thus, seeking of immediate reward in ADHD might
reflect underlying mechanisms linking increased discounting
with states of internal deprivation. One such mechanism would
be that outlined above of higher rates of reward available from
alternative tasks. For example, say that children with ADHD have
an internal state resembling a deprivation of loving attention;
their performance of tasks that do not offer this attention, such as
quiet private study, is likely to be more impatient, so as to more
quickly return to actions that do command attention from others.
Increased Estimates of Uncertainty and
Hazard
Although conventional discounting tasks offer choices between
rewards that are promised to be delivered with certainty,
decision-makers likely come to the task with a prior belief
regarding the level of hazard in the environment, and so
tend to implicitly distrust the experimenter’s assertion that the
future rewards are guaranteed. In support of this, discount
rates amongst cigarette smokers have been shown to correlate
positively with their belief that the future reward will be delivered
(Reynolds et al., 2007). Also, within a standard discounting
questionnaire, people discount more steeply when rewards
are framed as being received from fictive characters rated as
untrustworthy, as opposed to from characters perceived as
trustworthy (Michaelson et al., 2013).
In an interesting study, Callan et al. (2009) measured
discounting in 56 undergraduate students who first watched an
interview with a HIV-positive woman. One group were told
that she had acquired HIV through unprotected sex and the
other group that she had acquired the virus via an infected
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blood transfusion. The latter group exhibited significantly steeper
discounting, an effect which was proposed to result from the story
of the infected blood transfusion having primed a belief that the
world is unjust. A related explanation, independent of feelings of
injustice per se, would be that the transfusion scenario increased
the perceived hazard rate for adverse life events.
Finally, as described previously, the ultimate hazard is that
one will die before the future reward occurs. In keeping with
this, in a South African population, discounting was found
to be higher amongst individuals with the lowest perceived
survival probability than amongst those with average survival
probability (Chao et al., 2009), and to correlate with the number
of bereavements of close family members reported by North
Americans (a factor putatively increasing perceived mortality
risk) (Pepper and Nettle, 2013). Furthermore, discounting has
been shown to increase on conscription into the Israeli army
(Lahav et al., 2011), and to be higher in youths living in slums
in Rio De Janeiro than in an age matched sample of university
students (Ramos et al., 2013).
Populations with psychiatric disorders might well believe that
future rewards are less likely to materialize (a higher hazard rate)
than do healthy control populations, for quite rational reasons,
given their life experiences (Hill et al., 2008). In other words,
the past is the best predictor of the future, and this may be why
psychiatric disorders associated with hazardous development
are characterized by higher discounting rates. Populations with
psychiatric illness have experienced an excess of major life events
compared with the healthy population (Paykel, 1978), and have
excess mortality from physical health conditions compared with
the general population (Robson and Gray, 2007). The latter
would be expected to be associated with lower perceived survival
probability, given correlations between perceived and actual
mortality in the general population (Idler and Benyamini, 1997).
To our knowledge no previous studies have examined this. This
may in turn result in decisions that perpetuate or worsen the
disorder. Indeed, Sonuga-Barke has hypothesized that the high
discounting rates measured in the laboratory in youths with
conduct disorder represent an accurate—and hence adaptive in
their native environment—summary of the increased hazards
that these youths so commonly have experienced (Barke, 2014).
An interesting possibility for future research would be to elicit
beliefs of groups with psychiatric disorder about the likelihood
that future reward will be forthcoming, and to regress this against
their discounting choices. Similarly further research is needed
to examine relationships between an individual’s experience of
significant life events, their confidence in the future, and their
level of temporal discounting.
The Cost of Thinking in Economic Poverty,
Borderline Personality Disorder and
Schizophrenia
It appears that a greater engagement of model-based control,
a faculty tightly dependent on working memory, is associated
with more future-oriented responses on discounting paradigms.
Promoting mental simulations of future outcomes by cueing
participants with episodes in their lives corresponding to
the timing of the options decreases measured discount rates
(Peters and Büchel, 2010). Higher working memory capacity is
associated with both lower discounting (Shamosh et al., 2008),
and an increased emphasis on model-based control (Eppinger
et al., 2013), while working memory training in substance
misusers has been found to decrease their delay discounting
(Bickel et al., 2011b).
In keeping with the above, functional neuroimaging studies
have found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), an
area often implicated in tasks dependent on working memory
(Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003), is sensitive to model-based
learning signals (Gläscher et al., 2010). This area is also known to
be active when choosing delayed rewards on intertemporal choice
paradigm (McClure et al., 2004, 2007). Furthermore, disrupting
dlPFC function (using either transcranial magnetic stimulation
or transcranial direct current stimulation) both decreases the
emphasis on model-based control (Smittenaar et al., 2013) and
increases temporal discounting (Hecht et al., 2013). The process
of mentally simulating future outcomes is also known to be
dependent on the hippocampus (Hassabis et al., 2007; Johnson
et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter and Schacter, 2008),
and rats with hippocampal lesions have been found to exhibit
increased discounting (Mariano et al., 2009). Taken together
these results suggest that mental simulation of the future tends
to generate more patient intertemporal choices, and that this
process is working memory dependent.
A plausible explanation for the above is that mentally
simulating the future resolves uncertainty about the utility of
larger-later rewards (see Daw et al., 2005). For example, I
might be uncertain about how much I am likely to require
money in 7 months’ time, but if I remember that my partner’s
birthday is in seven and a half months’ time, and I anticipate
needing the money to buy him or her an expensive present,
I might revise my estimate of the utility of the future
money. An interesting possibility is that decision-makers face
a trade-off between making the best possible decisions and
doing so in a timely manner with the minimum of effort.
Model-based simulation of the future is compuationally costly,
i.e., consumes time and energy. If conditions are sufficiently
unpredictable, then attempting to explicitly plan out future
possibilities is futile, and may even be disadvantageous (see
Daw et al., 2005). Thus, prolonged exposure to an unstable
environment during development ought to both discourage
the use of model-based strategies and increase discounting
via greater uncertainty associated with future rewards. This
possibility would conceptually bind together an unstable
childhood environment, diminished cognitive ability and steeper
discounting of reward, providing a tentative theoretical basis
for explaining the association between these factors in several
psychiatric disorders. For example, people with borderline
personality disorder are likely to have experienced childhood
abuse (Lewis and Christopher, 1989; Ogata et al., 1990; Zanarini
et al., 1997), exhibit below average cognitive function (Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993) and discount the future more steeply than
healthy controls (Lawrence et al., 2010).
A similar interaction might in part underlie associations
between low socioeconomic status, steeper discounting and
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psychiatric disorder. Bickel et al. (2014a, 2011a) propose a
neuropsychological explanation for relationships between low
socioeconomic status and unhealthy lifestyle choices, in terms of
a dual-systems model of cognition, whereby low socioeconomic
status encourages engagement of a more “impulsive” decision-
making system, putatively mediated by limbic brain structures,
over an “executive” decision-making system, mediated by parts
of frontal cortex. The authors point to evidence that several
neurocognitive abilities including working memory, declarative
memory, and cognitive control exhibit socioeconomic gradients
(Noble et al., 2007). This association appears to hold in
prospective analyses too. On a developmental timescale, Evans
and Schamberg (2009) show that childhood poverty predicts
lower working memory in young adulthood, and that high levels
of childhood stress mediate this relationship. State-based effects
of poverty on cognitive function are also evident, for example
Indian sugar-cane farmers exhibit worse cognitive performance
before their harvest, when they are poor, than after their harvest,
when they are richer, even controlling for levels of stress (Mani
et al., 2013). The dual-systems approach is not incompatible with
our three-way division of behavioral control. The model-based
system for instance appears to depend on executive functions
such as working memory, but has the advantage of carrying
a specific algorithmic meaning. Also, we envisage the three-
controllers as sharing the mutual goal of maximizing reward
(Dayan et al., 2006), and suggest that their relative deployment is
also subject to a cost-benefit trade-off (Daw et al., 2005; Dezfouli,
2009; Huys et al., 2012). We therefore go as far as to propose
that diminished deployment of model-based control in states of
deprivation might reflect an evolutionary milieu in which such
changes were approximately optimal, for example in response to
irreducible future uncertainty.
Deficits in future thinking appear likely to underlie steeper
discounting seen in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia
compared with healthy controls (Heerey et al., 2007, 2011),
in keeping with observations that such patients often exhibit
cognitive and executive dysfunction. Furthermore, patients with
schizophrenia exhibit atrophy of frontal and temporal brain
regions (Madsen et al., 1999; Velakoulis et al., 2001; van
Haren et al., 2008), a pattern which would be expected to be
accompanied by shortened time perspective, given the role of
these structures in imagining future scenarios (Hassabis et al.,
2007; Johnson et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter and
Schacter, 2008). Heerey et al. (2011) present evidence to support
this view, comparing measures of discounting, cognitive function
and “future representation” in 39 patients with schizophrenia
and 25 healthy control participants. Patients discounted more
steeply than controls, and when asked to list events which they
thought might happen to them in their lives, on average reported
future life-events that were nearer in time. This shortened future
perspective correlated with lower working memory scores in
both patients and controls, to the extent that controlling for
working memory abolished the effect of schizophrenia status
on discounting. These results suggest that discounting deficits
in schizophrenia are attributable to an impaired ability to
imagine the future, a faculty that is limited by working memory
capacity.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The above account leaves considerable room for future research.
The foregoing discussion has largely focused on appetitive
processes evoked in the appraisal of future rewards. A
complementary, but distinct, set of principles might apply
to how humans evaluate future punishment. For example,
as a complement to the theory that tonic dopamine signals
the average reward rate, it has been proposed that tonic
serotonin signals the long run average punishment rate, and
thus controls the vigor of avoidance behavior (Dayan, 2012a,b,
see also Crockett et al., 2012). This idea might hold relevance
for increased discounting in depression, which is associated
with both marked avoidance (Ferster, 1973) and possible
serotonergic abnormalities (e.g., Mann et al., 2000). Although a
normative account of the role of serotonin in depression remains
elusive, it is interesting that decreasing serotonin availability
(achieved by tryptophan depletion) in healthy subjects acts
to increase discounting (Tanaka et al., 2007; Schweighofer
et al., 2008), commensurate with increased discounting seen
in depression (Takahashi et al., 2008; Dennhardt and Murphy,
2011; Dombrovski et al., 2011, 2012; Imhoff et al., 2014; Pulcu
et al., 2014) (For further discussion of temporal preferences for
punishment see Berns et al., 2006; Story et al., 2013, 2015).
A further area for future research concerns the effect of
stress on discounting (e.g., Diller et al., 2011; Kimura et al.,
2013). A recent meta-analysis (Fields et al., 2014) of 16 studies
examining the relationships between delay discounting or delay
of gratification and subjective or physiological measures of stress
and found that stress was associated with steeper discounting,
with a large aggregate effect size (Hedge’s g = 0.59). Seemingly
contradicting these findings, low baseline cortisol levels have
been associated with increased delay discounting (Takahashi,
2004), and similarly predict higher discounting at 6 month follow
up (Takahashi et al., 2009). A possible explanation would be
that baseline stress and responsivity to stress manipulations exert
distinct influences on discounting. In part supporting this idea,
Lempert et al. (2012) found that when placed under stressful
conditions, individuals with low trait perceived stress showed
higher discounting than those with high trait perceived stress,
perhaps reflecting greater responsiveness to acute stressors in
subjects with low trait stress. In addition acute administration
of hydrocortisone, a key hormone involved in stress response,
has been found to cause a short-lived increase in discounting
(Cornelisse et al., 2013). Further work is required to understand
the relationships between baseline and induced stress and their
interaction with discounting, as well as to characterize stress in
terms of the information content of stressful situations.
The above account has not specifically addressed willpower.
Several lines of evidence point to the fact that humans often
renege on best-laid plans, in favor of immediate consumption.
We propose that this results since people are poor in predicting
in advance the effect of conditioned cues and motivational
state changes on their behavior (see also Loewenstein, 1996;
Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Read, 2001; Chapman, 2005; Dayan
et al., 2006; Story et al., 2014). Thus, one might plan to
abstain from eating dessert as part of a diet plan, but find it
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harder to resist when presented with a piece of cake (see for
example Read and Van Leeuwen, 1998; Allan et al., 2010) and
relapses in drug-taking behavior following abstinence commonly
occur after exposure to a previous drug-taking environment
(O’Brien et al., 1998). Similarly, people appear poor in predicting
their behavior in future motivational states that differ from
their current motivational state. For example, in a study
of analgesic preferences for childbirth (Christensen-Szalanski,
1984), women asked roughly 1 month in advance of labor
preferred to avoid invasive spinal anesthesia in favor of less
invasive but less effective pain relief methods, however during
active labor women frequently reversed preference and opted
for anesthesia. “Battles of will” then consist in the attempt to
punish or extinguish existing habitual or Pavlovian responses
through the imposition of countervailing model-based (goal-
directed) valuations. Hyperbolic discounting theoretically gives
rise to similar intertemporal choice conflicts, but considered
alone has difficulty accounting for the state-dependence of real
world failures of self-control. Thus, in the study of Christensen-
Szalanski (1984) it seems likely to be the transition into a
painful state that brings about a shift in womens’ preferences
for analgesia, rather than the time preceding childbirth per se as
hyperbolic discounting would suggest. An interesting direction
for future research will be to examine whether individuals
with psychiatric disorders, for example borderline personality
disorder, exhibit greater choice inconsistency over time, relative
to controls. This possibility would accord with a well-esteemed
theory that individuals with borderline personality disorder are
impaired in modeling mental states (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004).
Another interesting direction not explored here concerns
discounting of past rewards (Yi et al., 2006; Bickel et al., 2008).
Discounting for past rewards has been shown to be systematic
and hyperbolic in form, and is correlated with the degree of future
discounting across individuals (Yi et al., 2006). Furthermore,
cigarette smokers are found to discount past, as well as future,
rewards more steeply than non-smokers (Bickel et al., 2008).
Symmetry between past and future discounting is in keeping
with evidence that remembering the past and imagining the
future are both dependent on the hippocampus (Hassabis et al.,
2007; Johnson et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter and
Schacter, 2008). Notably past discounting is difficult to directly
account for in terms of some of the informational influences
suggested in this article. Growth potential for example ought
to motivate having received rewards in the distant past, since
these should have had time to accrue greater value. Further
work is clearly needed to understand the possible normative
basis of past discounting. One possibility is that factors tending
to foreshorten model-based consideration of future outcomes,
such as uncertainty, also dimish retrieval of episodic memories,
leading to a narrowing of temporal perspective. Notably, the
learning rate in model-free reinforcement learning algorithms
corresponds to an exponential discount factor for past reward.
Yechiam et al. (2005) have shown that susbtance misusers and
inidividuals with ventral medial prefrontal cortex lesions both
exhibit increased learning rates on the Iowa gambling task, where
an excessive focus on recent reinforcement is disadvantageous.
This suggests that high learning rates might reflect a form of
“retrospective impulsivity,” through assigning too little weight to
distant past experience. Further work is required to explore this
possibility.
A final consideration is that of how discounting differs
between different forms of outcome. Discounting for several
forms of appetitive outcome shows consistency across
individuals, for example discount rates for money are strongly
and significantly correlated with other forms of appetitive
outcome, such as the discounting of cigarettes for cigarette
smokers, the discounting of heroin for opioid-dependent
outpatients and the discounting of food amongst college students
(Odum, 2011; Pearson r = 0.93; p = 0.0007 for money vs. the
mean of all other outcomes). However, rates are not identical
across commodities: people tend to discount primary reinforcers
such as food, water and sex more steeply than money (Lawyer
et al., 2010; Odum, 2011; Jarmolowicz et al., 2013) and a number
of studies have shown that people with substance dependence
discount their drug of abuse more steeply than money (e.g.,
Madden et al., 1997; Bickel et al., 1999; Petry, 2001). Steeper
discounting for primary reinforcers might reflect their greater
engagement of innate appetitive systems. In other words,
deliberative consideration of primary reinforcers might increase
attention to the relevant underlying deficit state (drive). Steeper
discounting then putatively results due to the negative Pavlovian
value associated with prolonging the deficit state. Further
research is needed to examine this possibility.
Interesting results have been obtained when discounting
choices are made across different commodities, for example in
choices between money now vs. cigarettes later, termed cross-
commodity discounting (CCD), as opposed to single-commodity
discounting (SCD). For instance, Bickel et al. (2011a, 2007)
examined discounting in cocaine-dependent individuals between
cocaine now vs. cocaine later (C-C), money now vs. money
later (M-M), cocaine now vs. money later (C-M), and money
now vs. cocaine later (M-C) conditions, where the amounts of
money and cocaine across conditions were equated in immediate
worth. Consistent with previous findings, C-C discount rates
were significantly greater than M-M discount rates; indeed there
was a significant main effect of changing the delayed commodity
to cocaine, consistent with cocaine being discountedmore steeply
than money. However, the authors found that, whilst C-M
and M-M discounting were statistically indistinguishable, M-
C discount rates were significantly higher than C-C discount
rates. Wesley et al. (2014) broadly replicate this result, and
Jarmolowicz et al. (2014) find a similar pattern of findings for
money vs. sex CCD, wherein a M-S condition was associated
with the steepest discounting. A possible explanation in terms
of the classical economic model would be that cocaine (or sex)
is both discounted more steeply and has a less concave utility
function than money. Bickel et al. (2011a, 2007) illustrate this
possibility though favor an explanation in terms of a framing
effect. We propose a framing hypothesis whereby primary
reinforcers are associated with a steeper implicit hazard rate than
money (this might in part underlie their steeper discounting,
but is of itself insufficient to explain the above findings); SCD
then hypothetically diminishes the implicit hazard rate, by
priming the idea that the commodity will definitely be received
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sooner-or-later. By contrast, the implicit exchange of money
for primary reinforcement in CCD hypothetically amplifies
the hazard rate for the delayed commodity, by priming the
notion that the delayed commodity is not guaranteed. This
hypothesis leads to the observed interaction, with the steepest
discounting for CCD in which primary reinforcement is delayed,
and is an eminently testable. The possible modulation of
such cross-commodity effects in various psychiatric disorders
might offer further clues as to the underlying decision
mechanisms at play.
In summary we have reviewed motivations for steeper
discounting of delayed reward. Discounting tends to be
increased across a broad range of disorders, including ADHD,
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, hypomania, depression,
borderline personality disorder and substance misuse
disorders. We have proposed that these findings can be
parsimoniously understood by examining the reasons why
people should discount the future, namely the opportunity
costs of delay, uncertainty associated with future outcomes
and the cognitive costs of resolving this uncertainty. We have
detailed different types of information processing in the brain
that can take these factors into account, broadly distinguishing
“parametric discounting,” whereby rewards labeled as delayed
are automatically discounted as a function of delay, vs. “planful
discounting” where the factors associated with the delay are
accounted for in the course of learning. Where possible we have
attempted to map these normative influences onto putative,
albeit broad neurobiological mechanisms. More generally we
propose that this approach, that is, attempting to understand
the biological substrates of psychiatric disorder in terms of their
physiological function, and in light of a person’s life history,
is key to bridging psychosocial and biological conceptions of
mental illness. We accept that our use of this approach here
might appear speculative. In essence, we feel is this justified
given the emerging nature of the field and await further research
developments with eager interest.
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